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Abstract 
In this paper, I show that a sizable component of emerging market sovereign yield spreads is due to 
factors other than default risk such as liquidity. I estimate the non-default component of the yield 
spreads as the basis between the actual credit default swap (CDS) premium and the hypothetical CDS 
premium implied by emerging market bond yields. On average, the basis is large and positive for 
speculative grade bonds and slightly negative for investment grade bonds. Large positive basis for 
speculative grade bonds support the existence of speculation in the CDS market when the underling’s 
credit quality is bad. I study the effects of bond liquidity, liquidity in the CDS market, equity market 
performance and macroeconomic variables on the non-default component of the emerging market 
yield spreads. I show that bond liquidity has a significant and positive effect on the CDS-bond basis of 
investment grade bonds. The results suggest that the liquid bonds of investment grade bonds are more 
expensive relative to the prices implied their CDS premiums. However, the results are somewhat 
mixed and even contrary for the speculative grade bond sample. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the past 10 years, emerging market sovereign bonds handily outperformed not only U.S. 
corporate bonds, but the S&P 500 equity index as well. Emerging market bonds are a very large 
and fast growing asset class; their trade volume in the world is expected to approach $8 trillion in 
2008.  Since emerging market economies carry a considerable default risk, they offer a yield a 
significant spread relative to their riskless counterparts. However, not the entire yield spread of 
an emerging market bond can be explained by the default risk alone. Recent studies on the US 
corporate bond market have noted that factors such as liquidity, taxes, and aggregate market risk 
also play important roles in corporate yield spreads. Therefore, it is interesting to explain; to 
what extent sovereign bond yield spreads reflect default risk and how much of their spreads 
relative to their riskless counterparts stems from factors such as liquidity and other market risk 
factors.  
A derivative instrument called Credit Default Swap (CDS) has become very popular in the 
last decade. Since CDS prices default risk explicitly, they are a considered as a good benchmark 
for the pure credit risk of the underlying entity. In this paper, I use CDS premiums to estimate 
the default and non-default component of emerging market sovereign bond yields and examine 
the link between the non-default component and liquidity. I study the difference between the 
CDS premium and the CDS premium as implied by the bond yields as a measure of the non-
default component of the bond yield.
3
 I refer to the difference between the CDS premium and the 
implied CDS premium as the CDS-bond basis, and I relate the CDS-bond basis to bond liquidity, 
speculation in the CDS market, CDS liquidity, equity market performance and world 
macroeconomic factors.  
My research has a number of significant contributions to both emerging market debt literature 
and to the literature on the non-default component of bond yields. First, to the best of my 
knowledge, this work is the first attempt to identify the non-default components of sovereign 
bond yield spreads. I use the data on US Dollar denominated bonds, which are issued by 21 
emerging market countries and their CDS premiums between January 2004 and May 2008. 
Second, I improve the literature on calculating the basis between actual CDS and implied CDS 
                                                 
3 The implied CDS premium is premium calculated using the same maturity, default probability and recovery rate 
implied by the bond yields.  
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premiums by relaxing the restrictive assumption of a “flat term structure of credit curves”.4 
(Figure 1 and 2)  
Third, my results on the distribution of the basis, i.e. the non default component, suggest clues 
about the speculation in the CDS market. This paper is the first one to present evidence on the 
speculation in the CDS market. My results confirm a large positive basis for speculative grade 
bonds, which suggests that on average, the CDSs are more expensive than what is implied by 
their underlying bond yields. When the news about a sovereign is bad, speculators -without 
owning the underlying bond- might speculate on worsening of the credit conditions of the 
underlying asset by buying the CDS contract. The excess demand to CDSs would increase the 
CDS premium while bond prices do not fall as much since the speculation is not directly related 
to the risk premium of the underlying.  
Fourth, I show that liquid bonds investment grade sovereigns are more expensive relative to 
the price implied by their CDS premiums. For speculative grade bond sample, the results suggest 
a mixed and even contrary relationship between the bond liquidity and the CDS basis. I use 
direct bond liquidity proxies such as bid-ask spreads and turnover ratios. I divide the bonds into 
two rating groups, as investment and speculative grade, in order to distinguish the effects of 
liquidity on bonds with different credit quality.  I illustrate that liquidity has a significant positive 
effect on the CDS-bond basis of investment grade bonds. Nevertheless, liquidity has a mixed and 
even contrary effects on the CDS-bond basis of speculative grade bonds. Some possible reasons 
include; limits to arbitrage due difficulty of short selling the bond and speculation in the CDS 
market. These are dealt with deeply throughout the paper. 
 As a novelty for this literature, I report that the domestic stock market performance of 
emerging markets have a significant negative impact on non-default component of bond yields. 
The reason for the negative effect seems to be related to credit risk and to the lead-lag 
relationship between the CDS and bond markets.
5
 
The important thing to note is that the focus of this research is emerging market sovereign 
bond yield spreads.  There are some main differences between the US corporate bond market and 
                                                 
4 Longstaff et. Al (2005) and Nashikkar et al. (2007) assume a flat term structure. However, credit curves are far 
from being flat (Figure. 1). Therefore, the results established by assuming a flat term structure are prone to be 
biased. 
5 Blanco et. al. (2006) and Zhu, H. (2006) 
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emerging market sovereign bond markets. These main differences include: Emerging market 
sovereigns use only bond financing. By providing large issue sizes and longer maturities in 
different currencies, they are among the world’s largest actors in fixed income markets. The 
credit event in their CDS contracts is defined differently from those of corporate borrowers since 
they do not enter directly into the asset liquidation process; instead they rely on debt 
restructuring processes.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review; Section 3 describes 
the data source and sampling schemes; Section 4 shows the methodology of calculation for the 
implied CDS premium and the CDS-bond basis; Section 5 discusses the results of my study 
showing the effects of bond liquidity, CDS liquidity, equity market performances, 
macroeconomic variables on the non-default component; and finally, Section 6 concludes. 
2  Literature Review 
Early researches have studied the determinants of US corporate yield spreads. On the emerging 
market literature side, a number of articles have also focused on the determinants of yield 
spreads.
6
 Some important papers on the determinants of US corporate yield spreads include 
Jones & Rosenfeld (1984), Longstaff & Schwartz (1995), Duffie D.  (1999), Elton, Gruber, 
Mann, & Mann (2001), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Spencer (2001) and  Liu, Longstaff, & 
Mandell (2006) However, these studies were unable to explain a significant component of the 
yield spreads, which is not attributable to default risk alone.  
Longstaff, Mithal, & Neis (2005) and later Nashikkar et. al. (2007), Han & Zhou (2008), 
Ericsson and Reneby, & Wang (2007) attempts to identify the default and non default 
components of the US corporate yield spreads.  Longstaff et. al (2005), assuming CDS premiums 
capture the default related component of the bond yields, use a common credit risk model for 
both corporate bonds and CDS to indentify the non-default component of the bond yields.  They 
find evidence on the existence of a significant non-default component. Moreover, they show that 
the bond liquidity as measured by the bid-ask spreads, outstanding amount and coupon rate has a 
significant explanatory power on the non-default component of bond yields. Nashikkar et. al. 
(2007) also investigate the relationship between the liquidity and US corporate bond yields and 
liquidity. They estimate the non-default component, as the basis between the actual CDS and the 
                                                 
6 For researches on emerging market sovereign bond spreads see, Ammer & Cai (2007), Hund & Lesmond (2006) 
and Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, & Singleton (2006) 
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“par-equivalent” corporate bond yield spread.  They also find a strong explanatory power of 
liquidity on the CDS basis. One common drawback of the models used by Longstaff et. al. 
(2005) and Nashikkar et. al. (2007) is that they assume a flat term structure of credit risk curves. 
However, the term structure of credit curves is far from being flat. My paper contributes to this 
literature on identifying and analyzing the determinants of non-default component of yields 
spreads by examining this relationship in the emerging market debt for the first time. I improve 
the literature on calculating the basis between actual CDS and implied CDS premiums by 
relaxing the restrictive assumption of “flat term structure of credit curves” by making full use of 
CDS maturities from 1 to 10 years. 
Blanco et al. (2005) and Zhu H. (2006) document on the co-integration relationship between 
the corporate bond spreads and CDS premiums. They argue that in the short run, the CDS market 
leads the corporate bond market in the price discovery process. Zhu, H. (2006) further argues 
that the short run deviation in is largely due to different responses of the two markets to changes 
in credit conditions.  
The literature on the emerging market  bond yield spreads and CDS market is limited. Even 
though none of the articles are directly related to my research, I present a very brief literature 
review on the sovereign CDS market. Pan and Singleton (2006), using the CDS pricing model 
suggested by Duffie and Singleton (2003), show an effort to distinguish between the default risk 
and the recovery risk in CDS premiums. Chan-Lau and Kim (2004) analyse the co-integration 
relationship between emerging market CDS premiums and the Emerging Markets Bond Index 
(EMBI), which is an index covering U.S. Dollar-denominated Brady bonds, loans and 
Eurobonds.  Ammer and Cai (2007) also analyze a co-integration relationship between bond 
yields and CDS premiums, and report the possibility of the significant impact of cheapest to 
deliver optionality in CDS premiums. Duffie (1999) shows that under certain conditions, there is 
an equivalence relationship between CDS premiums and yield spreads on a floating par bond 
with the same credit risk and maturity. However, since most emerging market bonds are straight  
fixed-rate, this equivalence does not hold precisely in practice. Therefore, searching for a price 
discovery relationship between the CDS premiums and the EMBI index or similar indices would 
result in biased conclusions.  
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3  Data Description and Sampling 
My bond data source is ISMA (the International Securities Market Association), which is the 
self-regulatory organization and trade association for the international securities market 
(including the Eurobond market).  ISMA TRAX is the ISMA trade matching and regulatory 
reporting system for the over the counter (OTC) markets.  Traded prices, yields and durations are 
also available on the Datastream system. 
I obtain all emerging “traded bond prices” from ISMA TRAX for all traded international US 
Dollar denominated bonds issued by sovereigns and find the corresponding yield to maturity to 
use in my par-equivalent bond yield spread calculation.  
My bond liquidity variables also come from ISMA TRAX. Bid-ask spreads of sovereign bond 
prices, average traded daily volume, outstanding market value of bonds and bond specific 
variables are obtained in a reliable way. Average daily volume for the previous month is 
calculated by taking the total nominal turnover for an individual bond in the previous month and 
dividing it by the number of working days in the month.  
Since CDS data coverage of CMA via Datastream started on January 2004, my bond data 
starts from this date as well. The total number of international US Dollar denominated straight 
fixed rate bonds by emerging market countries reaches t180. In order to include a particular bond 
in my sample, the issuer country’s CDS contracts must be available for its US Dollar 
denominated bonds. However, most east European countries have their CDS contracts issued for 
their Euro denominated bonds, although they have also issued many international bonds on the 
US Dollar. This fact reduces my sample size of bonds to 107.  The daily data availability 
together with the fact that 90% of the bonds cover my entire sample time period provides a 
sample size of more than 100.000 days. 
My CDS data are collected from the Datastream start in January 2004 until May 2008. Quoted 
CDS mid rate premiums along with their bid-ask spreads are available as daily variables. Data on 
interest rates, such as swap rates and treasury rates are obtained from Datastream. In my analysis, 
I use swap rate as the risk free rate, which is now widely believed to be closer to the risk free rate 
benchmark used by market participants in pricing derivatives.  
MSCI is the index used for examining the effects of equity market performances of 
sovereigns on non-default component of bond yield spreads.  MSCI is an index created by 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) that is designed to measure equity market 
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performance in global emerging markets. The Emerging Markets Index is a float-adjusted market 
capitalization index. As of May 2005, it consisted of indices in 26 emerging economies: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Israel, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, 
South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela 
With the purpose of accounting for macroeconomic conditions, the level and slope of US 
treasury term structure, the return and implied volatilities on the S&P500 index are exploited. 
Moody’s long term liability ratings for sovereigns are used to group the sample by investment 
and speculative rating grades. These variables are also available via Datastream.     
4 Methodology 
4.1  Par-equivalent Bond Yield Spread 
There have been two main approaches to estimate the default component of the bond yield 
spreads; one uses an explicit model for pricing credit risk while the other relies on CDS 
premiums. The former approach relies on calibrating a corporate bond pricing model matching 
historical data on corporate bonds (Huang and Huang, (2003)). The main disadvantage of this 
approach is that these models are very sensitive to model selection on both default process and 
risk premium. Considering default events occur at a much smaller frequency in sovereign 
markets, it becomes even more difficult to estimate the default component by relying on 
calibration with historical data. 
On the other hand, the existence of an efficient and liquid CDS market allows us to isolate 
default risk in bonds issued by a certain issuer without relying too much on a particular model 
selection or historical data, since a direct market pricing of credit risk is available in the CDS 
market.  
In fact, Duffie (1999) showed that under certain conditions there is an equivalence 
relationship between CDS premiums and yield spreads on a floating-rate par bond with the same 
credit risk. Since most emerging market bonds are fixed-rate bonds, the equivalence suggested 
by Duffie (1999) does not hold precisely in practice. Longstaff et al. (2005) showed that the basis 
between the pure corporate bond spread and CDS is a biased measure of the non-default 
component.  
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Another factor complicating the above equivalence relationship stems from the delivery of the 
reference obligation in the case of a default. In the case of a default, the buyer of the insurance 
has to deliver an eligible bond to the protection seller in order to get the face value of the bond. 
Obviously, this deliverable bond will be the cheapest among all deliverable bonds. Moreover, if 
the deliverable bonds are illiquid, the buyer of the CDS protection may bear additional costs to 
obtain the bond.  
One CDS based approach used to determine default and non-default components of corporate 
bonds is to use the difference between the CDS premium and the corporate bond yield as a proxy 
for the non-default component. Han and Zhou (2008) take this approach one step further. They 
add swap rates to CDS premiums to estimate a CDS-implied par yield curve, and use this curve 
to bootstrap the zero yield curves and discount the cash flows of each bond to obtain a CDS-
implied bond price. They call the difference between actual and CDS-implied bond prices as the 
basis, i.e. non-default component. However this approach may lead to errors, because the above 
relationship between CDS premiums and par yields holds only for floating-rate par yield bonds. 
Considering most of the emerging market bonds have high fixed coupon rates, the majority of the 
time they sell at a premium. However, CDS protects only up to a bond’s face value. So, 
discounting bonds’ cash flows with a zero curve obtained by CDS premiums will most probably 
be biased. 
Longstaff et al. (2005) used a credit risk model to price the CDS and corporate bonds. While 
this approach addresses the problems of bonds selling at par or discount, it is heavily model-
dependent. The literature on credit risk models demonstrates that there remain significant pricing 
errors in all the models that have been used so far (Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam and Mahanti 
(2007)).  
This paper follows the market participants and uses a method called par-equivalent CDS 
spread of the bond in order to isolate the non-default component of the bond yields. The problem 
of deviations of the bond price from its par value is addressed in this method. Since this model 
does not require any explicit calibration of a credit risk model, it is model independent. In the 
related paper by Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam, Mahanti (2007), although the authors used a 
similar method to isolate the non-default component of yield spreads on corporate bonds, they 
assumed a flat term structure of credit curves. Due to poor CDS maturity diversity, they use only 
5 year CDS premium data, although their bond sample included bonds maturing from 1 month to 
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40 years. This assumption leads to a major error. As the Mexico example in Figure 1 shows, the 
term structure of credit risk is far from being flat for emerging markets; rather, its slope is steeply 
positive. The assumption of flat term structure will lead to biased results of the basis for the 
bonds with maturities not equal to 5 years.  For instance, think about a bond with a maturity of 
10 years and a steep upward sloping credit curve. In this case, calculating the 5-year hypothetical 
par-equivalent CDS spread using the default rates extracted from a 10-year bond assuming 
constant default rates will cause result in upwards biased hypothetical 5-year CDS premiums. As 
a result, the basis between the actual 5 year CDS and the par-equivalent CDS premiums will be 
downwards biased, which will cause errors when measuring the effects of liquidity. 
My methodology of isolating the non-default component allows for non-flat credit curve term 
structures. The details of the methodology of par-equivalent CDS premium and CDS-bond basis 
is provided in the following section. The methodology to compute the basis is briefly as follows: 
First, I back out the average probability of default from the market prices of bonds, using swap 
rates as a risk free curve. Second, using this average probability of default, I compute the 
expected payoffs of the protection buyer and seller in a hypothetical CDS contract, which has the 
same maturity as the corresponding bond’s remaining maturity.  By applying no arbitrage 
condition, the CDS premium, which makes the expected payoffs of protection buyer and seller 
equal, is my hypothetical par equivalent CDS premium. 
The important virtue of this hypothetical CDS contract is that it has the same maturity of the 
corresponding bond from which the default probabilities are extracted. Since all emerging 
market countries in my data sample have CDS dates of maturity from 1 to 10 years, I am able to 
control for the non-flat term structure of credit curves. The basis for a specific bond is then 
computed as follows:  
 
                                       
 
where i∈ (0,10] is the maturity of the corresponding bond.             is the market premium of 
a CDS contract with a maturity of i years.                     is the implied CDS premium, which 
is computed by extracting the default probabilities from a bond maturing in i years. Actual CDS 
premiums for intermediate dates are found by linear interpolation. 
Considering the above definition, without liquidity risk, when the basis is negative an 
arbitrage strategy would involve buying the bond and the CDS together with the same maturity. 
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In this way, credit risk is hedged and the basis, i.e. non default component, is earned. This 
arbitrage strategy is feasible when the bond market is liquid. When the basis is positive, the 
arbitrage strategy would sell the CDS protection and short sell the corresponding bond. As 
argued in Duffie (1999) and Duffie et al. (2002b) and Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam, Mahanti 
(2007), shorting a bond is costly because it is difficult to find it in the securities borrowing and 
lending market.  If the bond is illiquid, then shorting that bond will be even more costly.  
  
4.2 Pricing of Risky and Risk-free Bonds and Extracting the 
Probability of Default 
The price of a defaultable bond today P0 is obtained as the sum of (risk-neutral) expected 
discounted cash flows.
7
 
 
     [∑
   
(    ) 
 
   ]      (1) 
 
       
If the bond defaults at time    , the following cash-flows are zero,                 
When valuing a risk-free bond, one does not need the expectation operator, since the cash 
flows are certain. The price of a risk-free bond    is then given: 
 
     ∑
   
(    ) 
 
         (2) 
 
Note that, the difference between the prices of a risk-free bond and a risky bond, both having 
the same promising cash flows, is equal to the discounted expected loss from holding the risky 
bond. Therefore we can generalize this relationship for coupon bonds as: 
      ∑
   
 (      )
(    ) 
      (3) 
 
The assumptions and the properties in above formula are : 
 
 :   Default is assumed to occur at coupon dates, which are semiannually in US dollar 
denominated emerging market bonds. 
P0:  Is the observed market price of the emerging market bond. 
                                                 
7 In this analysis, the probability of default estimation and CDS valuation follow the risk-neutral valuation approach 
discussed in Hull, J and White, A., 2001 
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B0:  The price of the risk-free bond with the same cash flows as the risky bond. It is 
found by discounting the cash flows of risky bond by the risk-free spot rate 
implied by Libor swap rates. 
   
 : Is the risk-neutral probability of default as seen from time 0. In my analysis I 
assume the probability of default is step wise constant. 
  :  This is the price of the risk-free bond that is expected to prevail at date    It is 
found by using the implied forward rates. 
  :  It is the claim that a bondholder has in case of a default. 
R:  R is known as the recovery rate. It is the percentage of the claim that bondholders 
receive in case of a default.  
r:  r represents the spot rates used to discount the cash flows. In this paper, Libor 
swap rates are used as risk-free spot rates. 
Note that in equation (3),    is the forward price of the riskless bond. Then, 
  
(    ) 
  is simply the forward price of a riskless bond discounted by risk-free rate. A discounted 
forward price from time   is nothing but today’s present value of the payments from time   
onwards. Then, we can rewrite (3) as: 
 
      ∑    
 (  
  
   
(    ) 
 )     (4) 
 
where   
  is the price of the riskless bond at time   discounted to today’s value. Finally, we can 
solve for PD assuming it is step-wise constant.  
4.3 The Hypothetical CDS Premium Implied by the Probability of 
Default and Maturity of a Risky Bond: 
In a CDS contract, the protection buyer pays a fee in regular intervals until the contract expires 
or a credit event occurs. Upon a default, the protection buyer receives the difference between the 
face value and the recovery value of the defaulted bonds. 
T is the life of the CDS contract. T is taken as the life of the corresponding risky bond, from 
which the probability of default, PD, is extracted.  If p denotes the annual CDS fee percentage 
paid to the protection seller, then the expected fee is: 
 
 [   ]    
 
 
 ∑ [
  ∑    
    
   
(    ) 
]      (5) 
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The expected gain of the protection buyer is then: 
 [    ]    ∑ (     ( ) )
   
 
(    ) 
       (6) 
 
Where, A(t) is the accrued interest as a percentage of the notional principal, F is the face value of 
the reference bond and f is the frequency of premium payment in a year.. 
Therefore in a CDS contract, by no-arbitrage argument, one would expect p, the CDS 
premium, to be such that expected gains from buying the protection is equal to expected fees 
paid for the protection. Equating (5) and (6) we get:  
 
Par-equivalent CDS premium =     
∑ (     ( ) ) 
   
 
(    ) 
 
 
 
 ∑ [
  ∑    
    
   
(    ) 
] 
     (7) 
 
p is then the hypothetical T year CDS contract implied by the probability of a default of the 
corresponding emerging market sovereign US dollar denominated straight, fixed coupon bond 
maturing exactly in T years.  
Finally, the CDS-bond basis is defined by the difference between the actual CDS premium 
and the above hypothetical CDS spread where their life equals the remaining maturity of the 
underlying bond. 
                                       
 
where i∈ (0,10] is the maturity of the corresponding bond.             is the market premium of 
a CDS contract with a maturity of i years.                     is the implied par-equivalent CDS 
premium, which is computed by extracting the default probabilities from a bond maturing in i 
years.  
Figure 2 is presented as an illustration of the calculated hypothetical par-equivalent CDS 
premium and resulting basis for one of Mexico’s international bonds issued in 2003 and 
maturing in 2014. 
4.4 Distribution of CDS-Par equivalent bond yield Basis and Bond 
Specific Variables 
Figure 3 is presented to give our audience a flavor of the distribution of the CDS-bond basis. As 
seen from the first histogram, the basis distribution in the overall sample has a positive mean and 
is right-skewed. This right skewness comes from the speculative grade bond side. The histogram 
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for the speculative bond basis shows a high degree of right skewness. In other words, the basis 
tends to be positive for the bonds issued by speculative grade emerging markets. On the other 
hand, for the investment grade sample, the distribution is more symmetric and even skewed a 
little bit to the left, causing a negative mean of the basis.  
These results suggest that the bonds of speculative grade emerging sovereigns are more 
expensive relative to their CDS contracts. However on the investment grade emerging markets 
side, the bond prices and the CDS premiums are more balanced, and in some cases CDS 
premiums are cheaper relative to their bonds. The situation for speculative grade emerging 
markets brings arbitrage opportunities to mind. An arbitrage strategy for positive basis would 
involve selling the CDS contract and short selling the bond. Shorting emerging market bonds is 
costly. Moreover, the cost is likely to peak just prior to default, since the demand from those who 
intend to deliver the bonds to the protection seller would exceed the supply. It is important to 
note that speculative grade sovereign issuers carry a very significant amount of credit risk. 
Therefore, arbitrage of the positive basis of bonds by speculative grade sovereigns carries much 
friction, which justifies the right skewness of the basis distribution for speculative grade issuers. 
Another reason for a large positive basis in the speculative grade bonds might be the 
speculative buys on CDSs written on bad credit quality bonds. When the news about a sovereign 
is bad, speculators, without owning the underlying bond, might speculate on the just by buying 
the CDS contract and waiting. The speculation could be either by betting on the occurrence of a 
credit event such as default or widening of the CDS premium. In either case, if the credit quality 
of the underlying worsens, the speculator would lock in a positive profit. The excess demand to 
CDSs would increase the CDS premium while bond prices do not fall as much as the speculation 
is not directly related to the risk premium of the underlying.  
 The above frictions are expected to be smaller in size and number for the investment grade 
emerging bond market. My results in Figure 3 for investment grade bonds support this 
hypothesis. It is seen that the mean of the basis is negative for investment grade bonds, meaning 
their bonds are cheaper relative to their credit risk implied by CDS contracts. Due to absence of 
short-sale constraints and its unfunded nature, the CDS market is thought to be more liquid 
compared to the bond market. Therefore it is natural to think of liquidity premiums included in 
the prices of investment grade bonds, which would cause bond yield spreads to be higher relative 
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to CDS premiums, resulting in a negative basis. This main hypothesis is analyzed in the 
following sections.  
The distribution of bond characteristics is presented in Figure 4. One would find the 
distribution of age, remaining maturity and issue amount of the bonds at the beginning of a 
regression sample period.  
 
4.5 Bond and Credit Default Swap Liquidity Variables  
The first bond market proxy is the average percentage bid-ask spread of the emerging market 
sovereign bonds. The bid-ask spread for each bond is calculated by taking the time series average 
of the daily bid-ask spread reported by Datastream. The second liquidity proxy is the average 
daily volume for the previous month. It is calculated by taking the total nominal turnover for an 
individual bond in the previous month and dividing it by the number of working days in the 
month. The third proxy is the notional amount outstanding for each bond.  The amount 
outstanding is used to measure general availability of the bond in the market. The fourth proxy is 
the age of the bond. This proxy is similar to the notion of on-the-run and off-the-run bonds in 
Treasury markets. There is extensive evidence that on-the-run Treasury bonds are much more 
liquid than off-the-run Treasury bonds. If there is a similar effect in the emerging bond market, 
then older bonds may be less liquid than more-recently issued bonds (Longstaff et al. 
(2005)).The fifth proxy is the time to maturity of the bond. In the emerging market debt market 
there might be a high level of maturity clientele portfolio behavior, which may cause shorter 
maturity bonds to be more liquid. Moreover, academic literature reports that high coupon bonds 
tend to be more liquid than bonds with lower coupon bonds. 
When the basis is negative, an arbitrage strategy involves buying the credit default swap 
protection and holding the bond until its maturity. However for an arbitrageur to benefit from the 
negative basis, CDS market liquidity is relevant as well. For hedging of a long position on a 
bond, the demand for bonds with higher liquidity in their CDS markets is expected to be higher. 
Therefore, one should also take into consideration the CDS market liquidity. In order to analyse 
this issue, I include the daily CDS bid-ask spread and the daily percentage CDS bid-ask spread to 
its mid-value as proxies for the liquidity in the CDS market, and relate these variables to the 
CDS-bond basis. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Correlations among liquidity variables: 
To check the consistency of the liquidity variables, Table 4 presents the correlations between 
bond and CDS market liquidity variables. The theory on liquidity suggests that while bond 
liquidity is negatively associated to bid-ask spread and the bond’s age, it is positively correlated 
to the turnover rate, coupon rate and issue amount. 
My findings suggest a negative correlation between bid-ask percentage and turnover rate, 
issue amount and coupon rate for all the rating groups. These results are consistent with the 
literature on bond liquidity.  
The correlation between bond market liquidity and CDS market liquidity is also examined. If 
we assume that increasing bid-ask spread and/or bid-ask percentage spread in CDS market 
represents its illiquidity, the signs of the correlation coefficients in Table 4 would allow for the 
existence a positive relationship between CDS and bond market liquidity.  
5.2 Determinants of Bond Illiquidity: 
In Table 5, I present results of the panel regressions of the bond price bid-ask percentage on 
various bond liquidity variables, CDS market liquidity and world macroeconomic variables. The 
purpose of these regressions is to analyze the determinants of bond illiquidity in different rating 
groups assuming bid-ask percentage spread and turnover by volume capture bond liquidity to a 
significant extend.  
Regressions of bid-ask spread on bond specific liquidity variables alone, such as turnover rate, 
coupon rate, bond life and bond age show expected results most of the time. Including CDS 
liquidity variables in the regressions, one can see a positive relationship between CDS and bond 
market illiquidity in all the samples. In speculative grade emerging markets, when the CDS 
market is illiquid, i.e. the CDS bid-ask spread is large, the bond market is also illiquid. This 
result is consistent with the perspective of the investors who, in search of hedging the credit risk 
of their long positions on the bond, buy the CDS contracts written on the same bond. When the 
credit risk is high, as in speculative grade bonds, this relationship is expected to hold strongly, as 
my results suggest. The possible spill-over effects from the CDS market to the bond market are 
analyzed in the following sections. 
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Regressions also search for the effects worldwide macroeconomic variables such as US 6-
month T-bill and US term spreads between 6-month and 10-year T-bill yields on bond illiquidity. 
My results indicate that an increase in the 6-month T-bill rate or term spread is associated with 
an increase in the illiquidity of the bond markets. This can be either because an increase in the 
US treasury yields reduces the demand for emerging market bonds, or because the world 
economy gets hit by a negative shock, which may increase instability in the emerging market 
economies.  
5.3 Determinants of CDS-Bond Basis:  
In order to asses the determinants of the CDS-bond basis, I use unbalanced panel regressions of 
the CDS-bond basis on various bond market liquidity variables, CDS market liquidity variables, 
corresponding issuer equity market indices and worldwide macroeconomic variables. Thirty-day 
averages of variables are taken to run this pooled regression. Regressions are run for three 
different rating groups in order to analyze possible differences between different credit risk 
groups. Data for bond, CDS, equity market and world macroeconomic indicators collected from 
Datastream allow me to reach a sample size of, at most, 90,000 data points for each variable.  
As discussed in Petersen (2008), in the financial data sets the residuals may be correlated 
across firms or across time, and OLS standard errors can be biased.  Petersen (2008) shows that 
the standard errors clustered by firm are unbiased and produce correctly-sized confidence 
intervals independently on the firm effect to be permanent or temporary. Extending the literature 
on corporate finance data to emerging bond market data, I cluster the standard errors by each 
bond. Therefore, I assume the standard errors are correlated among each bond group. 
 
5.3.1 Emerging Market Bond Liquidity  
To check the individual effects of each bond liquidity variable on the CDS-par equivalent bond 
basis, I first run univariate regressions for different rating groups. Since the CDS market is 
expected to be more liquid compared to the bond market, one would expect the bond prices to 
bear a liquidity premium. My hypothesis is that the liquid bonds of investment grade emerging 
markets should be more expensive in the cross section, which would be indicated by a positive 
relationship between the CDS-bond basis and liquidity. As mentioned in section 3.2, the 
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relationship between liquidity and the basis might even be inverse for speculative bonds, i.e. 
illiquid bonds of speculative grade emerging markets might be more expensive.   
Consistent with the above hypothesis, the bid-ask spread, turnover by volume and coupon 
variables have the expected signs, and their magnitudes are significant for investment grade and 
pooled samples. For speculative grade bonds however, the bid-ask percentage variable has a 
positive sign and is statistically significant at a 95% significance level, which signals a positive 
impact of bond illiquidity on risky bond prices. 
In Table 7, the first column of regressions presents the results of the panel regressions of the 
monthly average CDS-bond basis to monthly averages of bond price bid-ask spreads, bond 
turnover rates by volume and other bond specific liquidity variables. As mentioned in the 
previous section, t-statistics are robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered by each bond. 
I find a significant correlation between almost all bond market liquidity variables and 
investment grade emerging market bonds. All the variables except bond issue size have the 
expected signs. Results show that bond bid-ask spread, bond age and ratings have negative 
impact on basis. As argued before, bond age and bid-ask spreads are associated with illiquidity in 
the bond market. As the bond market becomes more illiquid, i.e. an increase in the bid-ask 
spread, one would expect the liquidity premium to be included in the emerging market bond 
yields, which would increase the bond yields and reduce the CDS-bond basis. My results show 
that a one percent increase in the bond bid-ask spread decreases the basis by fourteen basis 
points, which shows that the bid-ask spread variable is economically significant as well. 
 Since turnover rate by volume and coupon rate are expected to positively affect bond market 
liquidity, their signs are expected to be the opposite of bid-ask spread and bond age. This is in 
fact the case. My results show that  the non-default component, i.e. the basis, of the liquid 
investment grade bonds tend to be smaller; in other words, ceteris paribus, liquid bonds tend to 
be more expensive in the cross section.   
Unlike the corporate debt market, emerging market sovereign debt relies mostly on debt 
issued in the form of bonds. Countries with high debt need to acquire more debt by issuing larger 
bonds. So, the issue size of the bonds might have misleading results for our purposes. While 
bonds may become more liquid as the issue size increases, the credit quality may decrease at the 
same time, which would explain why the issue size variable has a negative sign. 
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The effect of the bond market liquidity of speculative grade emerging markets on the non-
default component of their yield spreads is ambiguous. The bid-ask spread, turnover by volume 
and issue amount variables have contradictory signs and insignificant t-statistics. Liquidity of 
speculative grade emerging market countries does not have much correspondence to the non-
default component of the yield spreads. Moreover the signs of the variables suggest that 
illiquidity (liquidity) in the bond market increases (decreases) the basis, which would mean that 
illiquid bonds of speculative grade emerging market countries might be more expensive relative 
to their liquid counterparts. In a CDS contract in the case of a credit event, the protection buyer 
has to provide the underlying bond to the protection seller to get the face value of the bond.  
When the bond market is illiquid, in the case of a default it might be difficult to find the 
underlying bond in the market to provide to the CDS seller. This could explain why when credit 
quality is low (speculative grade bonds), illiquid bonds might become more expensive. 
The results on remaining maturity are consistent with the previous studies suggesting that a 
large fraction of yield spreads, especially at the long end of the maturity range, cannot be solely 
explained by credit risk (Longstaff et al. (2005)).  
Table 10 shows the results of unbalanced panel regressions of the par-equivalent basis on 
various bond liquidity variables, MSCI equity market indices and ratings controlling for country 
fixed effects. As can be seen from the table, the results show the impact of bond liquidity on the 
CDS-bond basis is robust for country fixed effects.  
5.3.2 Emerging Market CDS Market Liquidity  
The results in the Table 7 report that liquidity in the CDS market has significant effects on the 
non-default component over the bond liquidity variables. A one basis point increase in the CDS 
bid-ask spread leads to a increase in basis of 1 basis points in the overall pooled bonds, two basis 
points in the investment grade bond basis and one basis point in the speculative grade bonds. In 
other words, if one assumes level bid-ask spread as a proxy for CDS market illiquidity, bonds 
with higher illiquidity in their CDS market are more expensive in the cross section.  
The above result might stem from two reasons (Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam and Mahanti 
(2007)). First, less liquidity in the CDS market is likely to drive investors towards the bond 
market, causing the bonds` prices to increase. The correlations between the turnover by volume 
and CDS bid-ask spreads in Table 4 provides some counter support for this explanation. One 
might note the negative correlation between CDS bid-ask spread and turnover by volume. This 
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means that when CDS illiquidity is high, the trade volume is low, which is the opposite of  the 
above explanation. The second explanation states that episodes of illiquidity in the CDS market 
are often associated to negative news about the issuers on whom the CDS contracts are traded. It 
is generally difficult to short bonds, which leads to bonds becoming more expensive relative to 
their CDS contracts especially during the illiquid periods in the market. 
The CDS bid-ask as a percentage has also positive sign and it is significant for speculative 
grade bonds and in pooled bonds. For investment grade bonds however the sign is negative. 
Assuming a percentage bid-ask spread as a proxy for illiquidity, the investment grade bonds with 
liquid CDS market have higher prices in the cross section. The problem of whether assuming 
bid-ask spread or bid-ask percentage spread as representing illiquidity in the CDS market is not 
easy. Both measures are subject to be affected by the level of the CDS premium. Taking the ratio 
of the bid-ask spread might reduce the explanatory power of the bid-ask spread variable. On the 
other hand there is a high correlation between CDS premium and CDS bid-ask spread, which 
makes level bid-ask spread a biased proxy for illiquidity in the CDS market. The interesting fact 
here is that, CDS liquidity variables have significant effects on the non-default component of 
bond yield spreads even when bond market variables are in the regression. This provides 
evidence of a liquidity spill-over effects from the CDS market into the bond market (Nashikkar 
and Subrahmanyam and Mahanti (2007)). 
5.3.3 Equity Markets  
In addition to bond market and CDS market liquidity, equity market performance of emerging 
markets has explanatory power for the non-default component of bond yields. The effect of 
equity markets has not been documented in this literature before. In order to analyse the possible 
effects of equity markets on bond yields, the MSCI index is used.  The MSCI index was created 
by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) to measure equity market performance in global 
emerging markets. 
As Table 8 shows, the MSCI index for each country’s equity market has explanatory power 
over bond liquidity variables. According to my regression results, equity market performance has 
a negative impact on the non-default component. One reason for this would be equity market 
performance might be negatively correlated with an emerging market sovereign’s credit risk. In 
other words, as the MSCI index increases, the credit risk and associated CDS premium should go 
down, which would reduce the basis (note that CDS-bond Basis =CDSactual- CDSimplied ). In order 
 21 
 
to eliminate this possibility I include actual CDS premiums in the regression. Even though the 
robust t-statistics decrease, the MSCI index variable still has a significant and negative impact on 
the basis for overall sample and speculative bonds, while on investment grade bonds the same 
negative effect has no significance. The explanation for this result is in line with the findings of 
Blanco et al. (2005) and Zhu, H. (2006) where the authors analyze the co-integration relationship 
between bond yields and CDS premiums. They find that in the short run, the CDS market leads 
the corporate bond market in the price discovery process. Zhu, H. (2006) further argues that the 
short run deviation in is largely due to different responses of the two markets to changes in credit 
conditions.  Since the equity market is more volatile in the short run, it is possible that CDS 
premiums internalize these equity market movements in its price earlier than the bond market; as 
a result, high equity market performance decreases both CDS premiums and their basis before 
the bond market reacts. I leave this lead-lag relationship for CDS and bond markets for future 
study. 
Table 10 shows the results of unbalanced panel regressions of the par-equivalent basis on 
various bond liquidity variables, MSCI equity market indices and ratings, controlling for country 
fixed  effects. As seen from the table, the results of the impact of equity market performances on 
the CDS-bond basis are robust for country fixed effects.  
5.3.4 Effects of World-wide Macroeconomic Conditions  
It has been shown that the credit risk on sovereigns depends highly on the world’s 
macroeconomic conditions. For instance, Longstaff et al.(2007) argue that sovereign credit 
spreads are generally more related to the U.S. stock and high-yield bond markets, global risk 
premia, and capital flows than they are to their own local economic measures. Moreover they 
state that a significant amount of the variation in sovereign credit returns can be used to forecast 
using U.S. equity, volatility, and bond market risk premia.   
I control for the credit risk of the sovereigns, to check whether macroeconomic conditions 
affect the yields only through the credit risk channel. I included the CDS premiums of the 
sovereigns in the regression to control explicitly for the credit risk and see whether world 
macroeconomic conditions have explanatory power over and above the credit risk of the 
sovereigns. As seen in Table 9, while the 6-month T-bill rate and the US term spread keep their 
significance, the S&P500 return index and its volatility lose their significance for investment 
grade and pooled samples. On the speculative grade bond sample, the significance of the 
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variables decrease but do not vanish when I include the CDS premiums. So, even if it is true that 
world macroeconomic conditions affect speculative grade emerging market bond yield spreads 
through the non-default component, the effects seem to be through the contingent credit risk 
channel for investment grade bonds, non-default components seem to not be affected by 
macroeconomic variables to a great extent. 
5.3.4 Credit Risk and CDS-Bond Basis: 
The impact of credit quality proxied by ratings is analyzed in Table 7 and Figure 3. Table 7, 
which reports the regressions of the CDS-bond basis on various liquidity variables and ratings, 
shows that ratings have a negative and significant impact on the CDS-bond basis. As ratings 
escalate from B1 to Aaa, the CDS-bond basis declines. Moreover, as presented in section 3.2, the 
average basis for investment grade bonds, i.e. ratings equal to or higher than Baa, is negative.  
The hypothesis is that liquidity and the cost of short selling have important impacts on the 
CDS-bond basis. When short selling is feasible, one would expect higher liquidity is associated 
with higher bond prices, thus the higher basis. However, the opposite can be the case under high 
short selling costs. The results in Figure 3 and Table 7 together suggest the following. First, the 
average basis is positive for speculative grade bonds, and negative for investment grade bonds. 
Second, as ratings increase the basis decreases and becomes negative for investment bonds. So, 
as credit risk increases, the CDS-bond basis increases, making the bonds more expensive relative 
to what would be implied by their CDS contracts. An arbitrage strategy for the positive basis 
would involve selling the CDS contract and short selling the bond. Shorting emerging market 
bonds is costly and this cost is likely to peak just prior to default, since the demand from those 
who intend to deliver the bonds to the protection seller would exceed the supply. Since 
speculative grade sovereigns carry a very significant amount of credit risk, positive basis 
arbitrage might be unfeasible.  
Therefore, the illiquid bonds of highly risky sovereigns might be more expensive relative to 
their liquid counterparts. In Table 7, illiquidity captured by bid-ask spread has a positive sign on 
the basis, and turnover by volume has a negative sign with insignificant t-statistics. These results 
for speculative grade bonds in Table 7 justify the hypothesis that with a considerable 
deterioration of credit quality the illiquid bonds may become more expensive. 
The above effects of friction in the investment grade emerging bond market are expected to be 
smaller since short selling is easier with higher credit quality and liquidity. Due to the absence of 
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short-sale constraints and its unfunded nature, the CDS market is thought of being more liquid 
compared to the bond market. Therefore, it is natural to think of liquidity premiums included in 
the prices of bonds of investment grade bonds, which would force bond yield spreads to be 
higher relative to CDS premiums and cause a negative basis. This main hypothesis is justified by 
the results in Figure 3 and Table 7. First, the mean of the basis is negative for investment grade 
bonds; in other words, bond prices carry a liquidity premium and they are relatively cheaper 
compared to what is implied by their CDS premiums. Second, as ratings increase, the average 
CDS-bond basis decreases. Third, liquidity has a positive and significant impact on the basis for 
investment grade sovereign bonds and this effect carries through to the non-default component.  
 
6 Conclusion 
In this research, I estimate the non-default component of emerging market bond yields and 
analyze the relationship between the non-default components of yield spreads with liquidity. I 
calculate the CDS-bond basis, which is the difference between the actual CDS premium of a 
bond and its hypothetical par equivalent CDS premium, as a measure of the non-default 
component, allowing for a non-flat credit curve term structure. I exploit nearly all available 
straight-fixed rate emerging market bonds denominated in US dollars between January 2004 and 
May 2008, which amount to 107 bonds. The data from Datastream allows me to use bid-ask 
spread and turnover by volume as my main liquidity variables. Moreover, I include coupon rate, 
remaining maturity, age, and issue amount as liquidity-related variables in my empirical analysis. 
My results show that while the basis is mainly positive for speculative grade, it is negative for 
investment grade bonds. In other words, the bonds of speculative grade emerging sovereigns are 
more expensive then what is implied by their CDS premiums. For investment grade, bond prices 
and CDS premiums are more balanced, and CDS premiums may even be cheaper relative to their 
bonds. So, CDS premiums of investment grade bonds imply higher prices for their existing 
bonds. The positive basis for speculative grade bonds is justified by the difficulty of arbitrage. It 
is difficult to arbitrage away the positive basis in a market with friction caused by short selling 
costs, which peaks with the increase of credit risk. Another reason for a large positive basis in 
the speculative grade bonds might be the speculative buys on CDSs written on bad credit quality 
bonds. When the news about a sovereign is bad, speculators, without owning the underlying 
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bond, might speculate on worsening of the credit conditions of the underlying just by buying the 
CDS contract. This speculation could be either by betting on the occurrence of a credit event or 
widening of the CDS premium. The excess demand to CDSs would increase the CDS premium 
while bond prices do not fall as much since the speculation is not directly related to the risk 
premium of the underlying.  
On the other hand, there are fewer frictional elements in the investment grade bond market. 
The fact that the non-default components of investment grade bond yields are negative gives us a 
clue that bond prices might include liquidity premiums, since the CDS market is expected to be 
more liquid than the bond market due to the absence of short-sale constraints and its unfunded 
nature ,  
I find significant the power of liquidity in explaining the non-default components of 
investment grade emerging market bonds. However, the effects of liquidity on speculative grade 
emerging market bonds are ambiguous or contrary to what I find for the investment grade bonds. 
These results are in line with my initial hypothesis that investment grade emerging market bond 
prices include liquidity premiums. On the other hand, I expect normal shorting costs, peaking 
with worsening credit conditions, might render the illiquid bonds of risky speculative emerging 
market bonds more expensive. My results also confirm this hypothesis; liquidity has counter 
effects on non-default components with increasing credit risk. 
As a novelty to this literature, I report that the domestic stock market performance of 
emerging markets has a significant negative impact on the non-default component of bond 
yields. The reason for the negative sign seems to be related to the credit risk and lead-lag 
relationship between the CDS and bond markets. 
CDS liquidity measured as bid-ask spread and percentage bid-ask spread also has explanatory 
power for the basis over the bond liquidity variables. Since higher liquidity in the CDS market 
would mean easier hedging of a long position on a bond, it is natural to think of bond market 
participants taking CDS liquidity into account when pricing the emerging market bonds.  
Another contribution to the literature is to explain whether the world macroeconomic 
conditions affect the emerging market bond yields solely through credit risk or through their non-
default components. Depending on the results, without explicitly controlling for credit risk, one 
can say that good short term macroeconomic conditions have a negative effect on the basis. In 
other words, better macroeconomic conditions may cause bonds to become cheaper than what is 
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implied by their CDS contracts. After explicitly controlling for credit risk, while the significance 
of the variables decrease but do not vanish for speculative grade bonds, the variables become 
insignificant for investment grade bonds. So, even if it is true that world macroeconomic 
conditions affect speculative grade emerging market bond yield spreads through the non-default 
component, the effects seem to be through the contingent credit risk channel for investment 
grade bonds; non-default components seem to not be affected by macroeconomic variables to a 
great extent. 
To summarize, this paper is a first attempt to isolate the non-default component of emerging 
market bond yield spreads and relate it with liquidity.  Thanks to availability of reliable 
transaction data in bond and CDS markets, I aim to offer some interesting and novel results on 
emerging market bond yields and on CDS market, liquidity, and stock market performances. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 Emerging Countries, Ratings and Number of Bonds     
      Moody`s Rating  # of Bonds     
  Brazil   Ba1 12     
  Chile   A2 3     
  China   A1 5     
  Colombia   Ba2 10     
  Egypt   Ba1 2     
  Korea   A2 4     
  Lebanon   B3 6     
  Malaysia   A3 4     
  Mexico   Baa1 9     
  Pakistan   B2 3     
  Panama   Ba1 2     
  Peru   Ba2 5     
  Philippines   B1 5     
  Poland   A2 5     
  Qatar   Aa2 4     
  Russia   Baa2 3     
  South Africa   Baa1 4     
  Thailand   Baa1 1     
  Turkey   Ba3 9     
  Ukraine   B1 4     
  Venezuela   B2 7     
 
Table 1: This table shows emerging market countries, their Long term liability ratings assigned 
by Moody’s and number of fixed-rate international US dollar denominated bonds included in 
the paper. 
The bonds in the sample are straight maturity and have fix coupon rates. 
Bond prices and yield to maturities are calculated again to check the correctness of the data. 
Among our sample of bonds, nearly 90% of them have bid-ask spreads, and 97% have either 
bid-ask spreads or turnover by volume data available. 
This data availability allows me to use direct liquidity proxies of bid-ask spreads and turnover 
ratios. All bond data is collected from Datastream and double checked by comparing the data 
from Bloomberg terminals. 
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  Distribution of Emerging Market Bonds by Moody`s Credit Rating   
    
Number of 
Countries 
Number of 
Bonds 
Regression Codes 
#   
  Aaa 0 0 21   
  Aa1 0 0 20   
  Aa2 1 4 19   
  Aa3 0 0 18   
  A1 1 5 17   
  A2 2 12 16   
  A3 1 4 15   
  Baa1 3 14 14   
  Baa2 1 3 13   
  Baa3 1 0 12   
  Ba1 2 16 11   
  Ba2 3 15 10   
  Ba3 1 9 9   
  B1 2 9 8   
  B2 2 10 7   
  B3 1 6 6   
  
Investment 
Grade 
10 42  #  >  11 
  
  
Speculative 
Grade 
11 65 
 #   <  12   
  TOTAL 21 107     
            
Table 2:  This table shows the distribution of United States Dollar denominated International Bonds 
Issued by Emerging Market Sovereigns by Moody’s Long term obligation ratings. 
A total of 107 US dollar denominated international bonds is issued by 21 emerging countries. 
The countries rated Baa3 and above are considered as investment grade while Ba1 and below are 
speculative grade. In the regression analysis, I number bonds with a B3 grade as 6. The numbers 
given to bonds increased with each rating to a maximum of 21, which corresponds to the rating Aaa. 
While 42 bonds are issued by investment grade emerging countries, the rest are issued by speculative 
grade emerging countries. 
Data is collected from Datastream and its validity is double checked with the data obtained from 
Bloomberg. 
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Summary statistics           
Variable Obs  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CDS-Par  Equivalent Basis 85393 40 60 -100 500 
Bid-Ask Percent 79991 0.7 0.6 0.0 6.4 
Par  Equivalent CDS 85383 122 105 -177 625 
Turnover by Volume (in millions) 79973 9.1 0.2 0.0 340.0 
Amount (in millions) 85393 999 491 2 3000 
Maturity (yrs) 85393 6.0 2.6 0.4 13.2 
Coupon 85393 8.2 2.4 2.0 14.5 
Age (yrs) 85393 4.2 2.6 0.0 14.0 
CDS Bid-Ask Sprd 85393 4.88 5.14 0.00 48.75 
CDS B-A Pct 85296 8.5 23.7 0.4 415.4 
MSCI index 68007 670 294 34 1742 
Moody`s Rating 85393 11.7 3.6 6.0 19.0 
6 month US Treasury 85329 3.9 1.3 1.0 5.3 
10 yr US Treasury 85329 4.5 0.4 3.5 5.1 
CBOEVIX 85329 15.3 4.5 10.5 26.4 
COMIX 85329 370 69 265 547 
S&P Composite Pr Index 85329 1309 125 1091 1536 
            
Table  3 :  This table shows the summary statistics of the average values of the CDS-par equivalent bond  
basis, percentage bid ask spread of bond prices,  issue amount, monthly average turnover by volume, 
remaining maturity in years for each bond, coupon rate, age of the bonds in years, bid-ask spread of 5-
year CDS premiums, 6-month  and 10-year US Treasury bill rate, Chicago Board of Exchange VIX 
index, CRN Commodity Price Index and S&P 500 composite price index. The MSCI index is the equity 
market index of the sovereigns produced by Morgan Stanley.  
While Bid-Ask Percentage, CDS Bid-Ask, Computed Par-equivalent CDS premium, Treasury Bill 
yields, CBOVIX, COMIX and S&P500 Composite index variables are daily, Turnover rate by volume is 
only available monthly.  
Computation of the Par-equivalent CDS premium and CDS-Par Equivalent CDS basis is explained in the 
text. Turnover Ratio is the ratio of monthly average turnover to the amount of bonds available for trade. 
Rating variable is Moody’s Long-term obligation ratings. Numbers starting from 6 are given to long 
term obligation ratings starting with B1 in our sample and continues to 21, which is the highest rating, 
Aaa. 
The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) is a key measure of market expectations of near-term volatility 
conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices. Since its introduction, VIX has been considered by 
many to be the world's premier barometer of investor sentiment and market volatility. 
The data is collected from DataStream 
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Correlations between liquidity related variables in the sample : Pooled Sample 
  
Bid-Ask 
Pct Turnover 
Issue 
Amt Maturity(yrs) Coupon Age(yrs) 
CDS Bid-
Ask 
CDS B-A Pct 
Bid-Ask Pct 1.00               
Turnover -0.20 1.00           (obs=76336) 
Issue Amt -0.20 0.15 1.00           
Maturity 
(yrs) 0.06 0.16 0.09 1.00       
  
Coupon -0.33 0.11 -0.12 -0.17 1.00       
Age (yrs) -0.11 -0.01 -0.29 -0.45 0.33 1.00     
CDS Bid-
Ask 0.29 -0.10 -0.25 0.16 0.08 -0.28 1.00   
CDS B-A 
Pct 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.12 0.01 
1.00 
Correlations between liquidity related variables in the sample : Investment Grade Sample 
  
Bid-
Ask 
Pct Turnover 
Issue 
Amt Maturity (yrs) Coupon 
Age 
(yrs) 
CDS Bid-
Ask 
CDS B-A Pct 
Bid-Ask Pct 1.00               
Turnover -0.20 1.00           (obs=30713) 
Issue Amt -0.15 -0.06 1.00           
Maturity (yrs) -0.02 0.09 0.02 1.00         
Coupon -0.65 0.36 0.00 -0.22 1.00       
Age (yrs) -0.15 0.17 -0.30 -0.58 0.58 1.00     
CDS Bid-Ask -0.12 -0.05 -0.25 0.26 0.10 -0.19 1.00   
CDS B-A Pct 0.02 -0.25 -0.34 0.09 -0.19 -0.18 0.57 1.00 
Correlations between liquidity related variables in the sample: Speculative Grade Sample 
  
Bid-Ask 
Pct Turnover 
Issue 
Amt Maturity (yrs) Coupon 
Age 
(yrs) 
CDS Bid-
Ask 
CDS B-A Pct 
Bid-Ask Pct 1.00               
Turnover -0.20 1.00           (obs=45623) 
Issue Amt -0.25 0.53 1.00           
Maturity 
(yrs) 0.13 0.32 0.16 1.00         
Coupon -0.19 -0.16 -0.12 -0.27 1.00       
Age (yrs) -0.05 -0.35 -0.33 -0.35 0.46 1.00     
CDS Bid-
Ask 0.50 -0.16 -0.26 0.14 -0.20 -0.28 1.00   
CDS B-A 
Pct 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.14 -0.02 1.00 
Table 4: These tables show the correlations between liquidity-related variables in the whole bond sample, 
investment grade bond sample, and speculative grade bond sample.  
Samples have observation numbers reported in the corresponding tables.  There are a total of 107 bonds issued by 
21 emerging countries included in the sample. All the variables are 3-month averages of their values. While Bid-
Ask Percentage and CDS Bid-Ask are daily, Turnover rate by volume is a monthly figure. As in the regressions, 
we use monthly averaged values of the variables. 
Data is obtained from Datastream 
 
  
 34 
 
 
Bid-Ask 
Percent                   
  All Rating Grades   Investment Grade   Speculative Grade   
  # 1 # 2 # 3 # 1 # 2 # 3 # 1 # 2 # 3 
T.over(mils) -4.46 -3.63 -3.61 1.37 0.72 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (4.41)** (3.83)** (3.76)** (1.3) (0.73) (0.90) (2.8)** (2.24)* (2.31)* 
Coupon -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.29 -0.30 -0.31 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 
  (2.02)* (2.44)* (2.43)* (4.54)** (5.09)** (5.38) (1.79) (1.63) (1.41) 
Mat.(yrs) 0.006 0.002 0.003 -0.010 -0.020 -0.023 0.035 0.027 0.031 
  (0.27) (0.09) (0.12) (0.29) (0.58) (0.70) (1.35) (0.91) (1.12) 
Age (yrs) -0.017 0.015 0.015 0.090 0.094 0.108 -0.010 0.030 0.030 
  (0.61) (0.52) (0.53) (2.34)* (2.23)* (2.48) (0.27) (0.77) (0.75) 
Amt(mils) -0.316 -0.184 -0.182 -0.080 -0.130 -0.120 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (3.74)** (2.08)* (2.05)* (0.62) (0.87) (0.81) (2.37)* (0.86) (0.82) 
CDS B-Ask   0.018 0.018   0.029 0.010   0.019 0.021 
    (2.96)** (2.76)**   (2.06)* (0.68)   (3.70)** (3.47)** 
CDS B-A%   0.0001 0.0001   -0.012 -0.009   0.0004 0.001 
    (0.13) (0.19)   (2.75)* (1.88)*   (1.31) (1.74) 
6 M. T-bill     0.026     0.277     -0.061 
      (0.59)     (6.18)**     (1.19) 
US Term     0.015     0.450     -0.145 
      (0.19)     (6.02)**     (1.59) 
_cons 1.78 1.49 1.37 2.23 2.47 1.16 1.34 0.75 0.94 
  (3.97)** (3.06)** (3.03)** (4.07)*** (3.88)** (1.93) (3.50)*** (2.21)** (2.06)* 
Obs 76420 76331 76282 30714 30712 30690 45706 45619 45592 
R-sqrd 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.51 0.53 0.56 0.15 0.30 0.32 
* significant at 5%                 
** significant at 1%                 
                 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses               
Table 5: Pooled and Rating-Grouped Regressions of Percentage Bid Ask Spread of Bonds on Various Liquidity 
Related and Macroeconomic Variables.  
This table shows the results of the pooled, investment grade and speculative grade bond samples of bid ask 
percentage variables on bond specific liquidity related variables, CDS liquidity variables and main macroeconomic 
variables such as 6-month and term spread between 6-months and 10-year US treasury yields. 
Above regressions are unbalanced panels consisting of 76420, 30714 and 45706 observations respectively. 
The t-statistics reported in parentheses are robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered by bond. 
Data is obtained from Datastream.. 
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CDS- bond Basis                             
  All Rating Grades Investment Grade Speculative Grade 
Bid-
Ask% -6.35           -29.50           13.97           
  (0.61)           (6.2)**           (2.3)*           
T.ovr(ml)   1.06           1.28           0.79         
    (7.9)**           (11.1)**           ( 3.3)**         
Mat.(yrs)     10.50           4.50           13.82       
      (6)**           (4.2)**           (14.1)**       
Coupon       10.40           8.48           -1.02     
        (6.4)**           (2.4)*           (0.5)     
Age (yrs)         -5.97           0.53           -7.04   
          (2.6)**           (0.2)           (2.5)**   
 Amt(ml)           -1.17           -0.66           0.01 
            (0.1)           (0.1)           (1.4) 
_cons 46.60 33.00 -23.20 -44.69 65.46 41.63 21.12 49.52 -24.60 -55.71 -1.27 
-
31.57 59.04 64.13 79.10 95.48 76.84 60.20 
  (5.59)** (6.33)** (2.4)* (3.48)** (6.84)** (3.48)** (2.66)** (1.93) (2.82)** (2.65)** (0.11) (0.65) (8.63)** (12.9)** (3.9)** (10.7)** (6.8)** (6.5)** 
Obs 79983 79967 85384 85384 85384 85384 32613 32842 36508 36508 36508 36508 47370 47125 48876 48876 33192 48876 
R-sqrd 0.005 0.120 0.200 0.170 0.069 0.000 0.240 0.610 0.078 0.200 0.001 0.000 0.020 0.030 0.001 0.090 0.034 0.006 
* significant at 5% , ** significant at 1%                     
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses                             
Table 6 : Univariate Pooled and Rating-Grouped Regressions of Average CDS - Par Equivalent Bond Basis on Bond Specific Liquidity 
Related Variables: This table shows the unvaried pooled and rating grouped unbalanced panel regressions of monthly-averaged CDS-Par 
Equivalent Bond Basis on bond specific liquidity variables.  
The distribution of bonds by rating and country are reported in Tables 1 and 2.  
The t-statistics reported in parentheses are robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered by bond.  
Data is obtained from Datastream. 
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Average CDS- bond Basis       
  All Rating Grades Investment Grade Speculative Grade 
  #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 
Bid Ask Percent 0.09 -4.24 -14.29 -17.40 4.93 -4.54 
  (0.02) (0.91) (4.69)** (6.85)** (1.18) (0.78) 
Turnover 0.79 0.82 1.02 1.02 -0.03 0.06 
  (3.70)** (3.98)** (6.06)** (5.79)* (0.15) (0.33) 
Coupon 7.02 5.93 3.25 2.21 6.93 6.53 
  (6.91)** (5.13)** (2.45)* (1.75) (4.42)** (3.93)** 
Maturity (yrs) 9.38 9.50 3.77 3.60 13.34 13.63 
  (6.93)** (6.58)** (5.03)** ( 4.41)** (10.38)** (11.25)** 
Age (yrs) -2.21 -0.02 -1.13 -0.65 -3.96 -1.37 
  (1.60) (0.01) (1.34) (0.86) (3.13)** (1.38) 
Amount -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
  (2.47)* (0.91) (1.76) (1.82) (0.97) (0.22) 
Moody`s Rating -6.85 -6.50 -3.11 -0.18 -5.02 -5.26 
  (9.23)** (10.87)** (2.34)* (0.10) (2.73)** (3.01)** 
CDS Bid Ask   1.07   1.78   0.93 
    (3.11)**   (4.73)**   (2.76)** 
CDS Bid Ask Pct 0.14   -0.70   0.14 
    ( 6.53)**   (4.59)**   (6.14)** 
_cons 19.35 -1.96 18.74 -16.27 -16.69 -35.59 
  (1.06) (0.11) (0.61) (0.49) (0.87) (1.91) 
              
Observations 76420 76331 30714 30712 45706 45619 
R-squared 0.65 0.69 0.80 0.82 0.48 0.53 
* significant at 5%           
** significant at 1%           
           
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses         
Table 7 : Pooled and Rating-Grouped Regressions of Average CDS - Par Equivalent Bond 
Basis 
This table shows pooled and rating-grouped regressions of average CDS-Par Equivalent 
Bond Basis on various bond liquidity variables, CDS liquidity variables and ratings. While 
regression #1 excludes CDS related liquidity variables, #2 includes them. 
A brief explanation of the variables is provided in Table 3. The distributions of bond 
samples can be found in Table 1 and Table 2 and Figure 4.  
Above regressions are unbalanced panels consisting of observations numbers reported in 
the tables. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are robust t-statistics with standard 
errors clustered by bond.  
Data is obtained from Datastream. 
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Average CDS- bond Basis : Effects of Equity Market  
  
All Ratings 
Investment Grade 
Speculative 
Grade 
  # 1 # 2 # 1 # 2 # 1 # 2 
Bid-ask Pct -2.08 -7.18 -16.05 -17.52 12.35 3.34 
  (0.38) (1.43) (6.0)** (7.48)** (2.2)* (0.63) 
Turnover 0.83 0.83 1.02 0.99 0.00 -0.08 
  (3.81)** (3.77)** (0.05) (5.56)** (0) (0.52) 
Coupon 4.61 3.65 1.89 2.02 9.05 4.98 
  (3.1)** (2.01)* (1.13) (1.31) (5.75)** (2.73)* 
Maturity (yrs) 8.15 7.58 3.49 3.64 11.99 10.93 
  (5.81)** (5.99)** (4.09)** (4.41)** (7.92)** (7.69)** 
Age (yrs) -1.10 -0.54 -0.31 -0.20 -4.60 -2.92 
  (0.9) (0.38) (0.46) (0.31) (3.39)** (1.92) 
Amount -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
  (1.81) (1.42) (1.86) (1.8) (0.7) (1.18) 
Rating -9.01 -4.02 -4.10 0.73 -13.27 -4.26 
  (7.73)** (3.12)** (1.79) (0.31) (5.27)** (3.14)** 
Log Equity 
Mkt  -13.34 -5.68 -9.14 -2.74 -12.27 -5.33 
  (4.41)** (2.03)* (1.71) (0.59) (4.08)** (2.30)* 
CDS premium   20.07   24.25   15.83 
    (4.86)**   (4.75)**   (3.96)** 
_cons 87.62 -0.03 49.46 -42.48 66.54 -17.35 
  (2.51)* (0) (1.01) (0.85) (1.89) (0.57) 
Obs 61691.00 61667.00 29704.00 29702.00 31987.00 31965.00 
R-sqrd 0.72 0.78 0.81 0.83 0.64 0.72 
* significant at 5%           
** significant at 1%           
           
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses         
 
Table 8 : Regressions of Average CDS- Par Equivalent Bond Basis : Effects of 
Equity Markets. 
This table shows unbalanced panel regressions of the average basis on liquidity 
variables and MSCI emerging market equity indices by Morgan Stanley. 
Regression #2 controls for CDS premiums. The index created by Morgan Stanley 
Capital International (MSCI) is designed to measure equity market performance in 
global emerging markets. The Emerging Markets Index is a float-adjusted market 
capitalization index.  
The t-statistics reported in parentheses are robust t-statistics with standard errors 
clustered by bond.  
Data is obtained from DataStream. 
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Average CDS- bond Basis : World-wide Macroeconomic Variables 
  
Pooled 
Sample   
Investment 
Gr. Sample   
Speculative 
Gr. Sample   
  # 1 # 2 # 1 # 2 # 1 # 2 
Bid Ask % -2.69 -7.39 -15.72 -17.48 1.58 4.93 
  (0.6) (1.46) (5.82)** (7.81)** (0.34) (0.91) 
Turnover 0.78 0.83 1.03 0.99 0.00 -0.06 
  (3.74)** (3.78)** (6.11)** (5.49)** (0.02) (0.41) 
Coupon 5.34 3.60 2.41 2.35 3.56 3.79 
  (5.42)** (2.05)* (2.0)* (1.51) (2.92)** (1.91)* 
Mat. (yrs) 8.46 7.53 3.59 3.69 11.57 10.57 
  (6.84)** (5.86)** (4.44)** (4.49)** (11.76)** (7.95)** 
Age (yrs) -0.64 -0.49 -0.52 -0.35 -0.94 -1.89 
  (0.49) (0.37) (0.72) (0.55) (1.06) (1.78) 
Amount -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
  (2.03)** (1.39) (1.78) (1.86) (0.58) (1.22) 
Rating -7.91 -3.77 -3.21 1.92 -4.89 -4.56 
  (10.61)** (2.11)* (2.41)* (0.75) (3.25)** (2.61)** 
6m T-Bill 14.69 11.04 3.22 5.20 29.00 22.60 
  (4.55)** (4.24)** (1.55) (2.36)* (7.03)** (4.86)** 
US Term S. 20.71 12.07 5.64 4.73 43.06 32.35 
  (4.51)** (2.84)** (1.7) (1.56) (8.14)** (3.54)** 
S&P500 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.10 -0.05 
  (5.79)** (0.01) (2.2)* (0.77) (6.52)** (1.69) 
CBOEVIX 0.71 0.10 0.57 0.04 0.30 -0.84 
  (2.27)* (0.34) (1.94) (0.13) (0.7) (2.38)* 
CDS   21.10   29.88   12.67 
    (3.65)**   (4.05)**   (1.95) 
Equity Ind.   -0.01   -0.01   0.00 
    (1.5)*   (0.69)   (0.18) 
_cons 52.34 -56.03 20.75 -104.33 3.55 -34.67 
  (1.93) (1.05) (0.62) (1.76) (0.11) (0.54) 
Obs 76369 61625 30691 29680 45678 31945 
R-sqrd 0.68 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.59 0.74 
 ** significant at 1% 
 *  significant at 5%        
Robust t-statistics are 
in parentheses 
  
          
Table 9 : Regressions of Average CDS- Par Equivalent Bond Basis : Controlling for Macroeconomic 
Variables.  
This table shows unbalanced panel regressions of the average basis on liquidity variables and 
macroeconomic variables including the 6-months T-bill rate,  the term spread between 6-month and 10-
year T-bill rates, S&P500 Composite Index, Chicago Board of Exchange S&P 500 Option Volatility 
Index. 
Regression #2 controls for CDS and MSCI country equity market returns. A brief variable description is 
in Table 3. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered by 
bond. Data is obtained from Datastream. 
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Par-Equivalent Basis with Fixed Effects       
  Pooled Sample Investment Grade Speculative Grade 
  # 1 # 2 # 1 # 2 # 1 # 2 
Bid-ask Pct 4.39 0.39 -17.86 -18.76 17.87 19.40 
  (0.63) (0.05) (3.72)** (4.32)** (3.1)** (3.13)** 
 Turnover 0.74 0.76 0.96 0.96 -0.12 -0.16 
  (2.93)** (3.09)** (4.25)** (4.31)** (0.74) (1.23) 
Coupon 6.64 4.39 4.59 3.50 6.83 5.44 
  (4.91)** (2.78)** (2.34)* (1.61) (4.15)** (4.89)** 
Maturity 
(yrs) 
8.91 7.32 4.18 3.88 12.01 10.59 
  (10.69)** (8.58)** (4.23)** (3.41)** (14.11)** (13.91)** 
Age (yrs) -3.37 -1.24 -1.35 -0.58 -6.58 -4.64 
  (3.33)** (1.26) (1.68) (0.86) (6.88)** (5.46)** 
Amount -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
  (2.12)* (1.43) (1.93) (1.93) (0.65) (0.56) 
Rating -39.34 -87.50 -3.51 -5.75 -18.89 -43.31 
  (3.19)** (4.56)** (1.59) (2.67)** (2.64)** (2.95)** 
Equity Mkt   -0.04   -0.01   -0.06 
    (5.46)**   (1.06)   (6.88)** 
Country Fix YES YES YES YES YES YES 
_cons 668.74 1627.09 20.63 63.01 52.74 471.39 
  (2.86)** (4.40)** (0.48) (1.58) (1.08) (2.81)** 
Obs 76420 61691 30714 29704 45706 31987 
R-sqrd 0.69 0.75 0.82 0.82 0.55 0.71 
* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%     
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses         
 
Table 10 :  This table shows the results of unbalanced panel regressions of the par-
equivalent basis  on various bond liquidity variables , MSCI equity market indices 
controlling for  country fixed  effects. A brief variable description is on Table 3.  
The t-statistics reported in parentheses are robust t-statistics with standard errors 
clustered by bond.  
Data is obtained from Datastream. 
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Figure 1: : Mexico 2004 and 2008 CDS term structure curves: 
The purpose of this figure is to illustrate a common example of the term structure of credit curves of 
emerging market countries. As is clear from the credit curves, term structure of CDS is almost always 
positive. That is why it is extremely crucial to relax the "flat credit curve term structure" assumption. 
The CDS data is collected from Datastream, which distributes data from CMA. 
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Figure 2: MEXICO. 2003 5 7/8% 15/01/14 S Bond Implied Par-equivalent CDS premium vs. Actual CDS 
Premium. 
This figure is an illustration of the calculated hypothetical par-equivalent CDS premium for one of Mexico’s 
international bonds issued in 2003 and maturing in 2014. As explained in the text, for each day starting from 
January 1st 2004 until May 2008, I extract the average probability of default for the remaining maturity of the 
bond from bond yields using US swap curves as a risk free curve. Then, I calculate the par-equivalent CDS 
premium using the extracted default probability and maturity, which results in the blue dashed line in the above 
graph. 
In my data set I have CDS maturities from 1 to 10 years. In order to compute the non-default component of the 
bond yields, I interpolate the CDS curve for the intermediate maturities, which results in the solid red line. My 
estimate of the non-default component is the difference between these two lines, i.e. the solid black line at the 
bottom is the CDS-bond basis. 
The data is obtained from Datastream 
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Figure 3: Distribution of CDS-Par Equivalent CDS Basis by Rating Groups. 
These graphs show the distribution of the calculated CDS-bond basis, which is an estimate of the non-
default component of the emerging market sovereign bond yield spreads. 
The data is obtained from Datastream. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of Age, Remaining Maturity and Issue Amount of the Bond Sample. 
The purpose of this table is to present the audience a flavor of the distribution of the bond sample used in 
the regression analyses. Age variable is the time in years passed until the  sample starting time of 2004. 
Remaining maturity is the remaining time in years until the bond expires. 
Issue amount variable is the amount of the bond issued by the emerging market sovereign in billions of 
US Dollars.  
Data is collected from Datastream terminals. 
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